



Director of  
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
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## POLAND: Possible Compulsory Deliveries

*The party paper claims that compulsory grain deliveries are the only alternative to bread rationing. There are reports of armed resistance in Wroclaw. The government is calling for public discussion of the future of trade unions.* [ ]

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A commentary in the party daily yesterday implies that compulsory deliveries will be introduced soon to avoid bread rationing. The article claims that the government is rapidly drawing down grain reserves and that daily procurements fill only 20 percent of the needs. [ ]

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Comment: The regime may be unhappy over farmers' initial response to the increased grain prices last week and their continuing reluctance to take up the government's offer to buy grain now with payment to be made in 1983-85 at prices existing at the time. Poland's inability to import more grain is prompting it to rely more on domestic procurements. [ ]

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The distrustful farmers--who can store grain for as long as two years--apparently are holding back because of their concern over unsettled conditions, their need to use grain for livestock feed, and their frustration with supply shortages. Forced deliveries would alienate farmers and would lead to some distress slaughtering of livestock. In the long term this would cause a further drop in meat supplies. [ ]

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[ ] the US Consul in Poznan reports that approximately 300 people, most of them soldiers who have deserted their units, have formed an armed resistance group in an isolated area near Wroclaw. The Consul has heard from other contacts about the formation of a "forest" unit of the Wroclaw Revolutionary Army and has received a copy of a letter in English from the group demanding the release of prisoners. [ ]

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Comment: This is the first report that an armed resistance group has been formed. Although it could easily be the product of the active Polish rumor mill, it should be taken seriously. Such an endeavor would be attractive to rebellious, romantic Polish youth; a number of signs suggest that Wroclaw has been a center of unrest. [REDACTED]

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The government has directed Deputy Premier Rakowski to prepare a report by the end of the month on "the premises for the rebirth of the trade union movement" and has called for public discussion of the report. Meanwhile, the regime has eased restrictions on US missions in Poland, apparently making good on Foreign Minister Czyrek's pledge last week that Western diplomats would soon be able to move more freely around the country. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The government appeared to be making some conciliatory gestures on the eve of the CSCE conference in Madrid in an effort to reduce Western criticism. The preparation of a report by Rakowski--who reportedly opposes revival of Solidarity--seems little more than the beginning of efforts to justify creation of a compliant trade union structure. [REDACTED]

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INTERNATIONAL: Terrorist Threats Against US Targets

*//A rash of recent reports indicates that US officials in several West European countries and in the Middle East are under increasing threat from disparate terrorist groups.//*

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According to the US Embassy in Paris, at least seven US officials there have been under intermittent and presumably hostile surveillance.//

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Red Army Faction is targeting high-ranking US military and diplomatic personnel. Italian and US terrorism experts are concerned that the Red Brigades will attempt to try a spectacular incident to regain their credibility. Meanwhile, a US Embassy in Latin America has received a report that a four-man hit team was en route last week to London to kill a US official.//

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//In Beirut, the US Embassy recently reported that Armenian terrorists may strike US targets to try to force the release of the accused killer of the Turkish Consul-General in Los Angeles. Moreover, Libyan leader Qadhafi's apparent beliefs that the US Navy is threatening Libyan territory and that the US may have been involved in an assassination attempt on him in December increase the likelihood of renewed Libyan terrorist acts directed against the US.//

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Comment: //A successful attack by one terrorist group tends to encourage similar efforts by others. The recent reports of terrorist plans vary widely in quality and specificity, but their volume and focus on US targets is cause for serious concern. If terrorist groups are unable to attack senior US officials, some may resort to attacking lower level US personnel or dependents.//

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SYRIA: Fighting in Hamah

*The Syrian Army reportedly has sealed off the central city of Hamah following new clashes there between government security forces and Muslim Brotherhood extremists.* [REDACTED]

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The US Embassy reports that the authorities have cut off all road, telephone, and telex communications with the city and have brought in additional military units since the situation began to deteriorate about a week ago. Heavy fighting continues, and there are reports of artillery and tank fire and airstrikes. [REDACTED]

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Government forces apparently include the armored brigade at Hamah, commando units, and elements of elite Defense Companies commanded by President Assad's brother. Another mechanized infantry brigade, which is reported absent from its garrison north of Damascus, also may be involved in the fighting. [REDACTED]

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Hamah, a largely Sunni city and a stronghold of the Brotherhood, has long been a center of activity against Assad's minority Alawite regime. In 1980 and again last December, fighting between security forces and Brotherhood insurgents and their supporters led authorities to seal off the city. [REDACTED]

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USSR-MOZAMBIQUE: Concerns Over Namibia

*//The USSR is increasina its efforts to disrupt a US-sponsored settlement in Namibia.//*

*//TASS, meanwhile, has given extensive play to the Cuban-Angolan communique over the weekend on the conditions for Cuban withdrawal from Angola. The Soviets are construing it as separating the issue of the Cuban military presence in Angola from a solution to the Namibian problem, although in fact the communique reiterates long held positions.//*

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*Comment: //Machel so far has not played a disruptive role in Frontline discussions on Namibia and is unlikely to be persuaded by the Soviets to do so soon. Nevertheless, he is waging an uphill battle against the South African - backed National Resistance Movement that eventually may compel him to move closer to Moscow on the Namibian issue in exchange for substantial military aid.//*

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*The Soviet treatment of the Cuban-Angolan communique is another indication the Soviets are worried that a compromise settlement will involve a reduction of Cuban and Soviet influence in Angola.//*

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CHAD: OAU Summit Outlook Dim

*African leaders meeting in Nairobi tomorrow and Thursday are unlikely to succeed in efforts to persuade Chadian President Goukouni to negotiate with rebel leader Habre, who could soon conclude he has no choice but to try to seize power.*

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The summit will explore ways to encourage Chad's factions to reconcile. It also will address financial and logistic problems facing the OAU peacekeeping operation in Chad.

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Habre's insurgents have continued to infiltrate large areas of eastern and northern Chad. French journalists who recently met with Habre believe that he is growing impatient with Goukouni and will attack N'Djamena if prospects for a political settlement do not improve.

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Comment: Goukouni--who may not attend the meeting--would have much to lose by including Habre in discussions aimed at forming a new government. The former Defense Minister is a shrewd negotiator and has easily outmaneuvered Goukouni in the past.

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The President could inadvertently give the rebels a pretext to move on the capital if he were to provoke them by trying to regain lost territory. Government forces are no match for Habre's well-armed, experienced guerrillas, and new fighting could cause the regime to break up and civil war to resume.

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Without continued Western financial support, OAU troop-donor countries will find it difficult in a few months to keep their forces in Chad. The collapse of the peacekeeping operation would enhance prospects for new Libyan meddling and would be a propaganda victory for Qadhafi, whose troops kept order in Chad for a year before they withdrew last November.

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[redacted]

USSR-EUROPE: CSCE Conference Resumes

*The CSCE review conference reconvenes in Madrid today in a charged atmosphere created by events in Poland.* [redacted]

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The Soviets and their East European allies are aware that they will be confronted by Western Foreign Ministers intent on focusing on Polish and Soviet violations of the spirit and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. [redacted]

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//The Western allies, however, disagree on how to proceed beyond what may prove to be two weeks of polemics. Many would prefer to resume discussion of the draft concluding document tabled before Christmas by the group of neutral and nonaligned countries but are sympathetic to US objections to conducting business as usual.// [redacted]

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//The West Germans continue to reject any suggestion of an early recess, but many Western delegations are reserving their decisions pending developments at the reconvened meeting. The neutral and nonaligned countries similarly have no agreed position.// [redacted]

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Comment: East European delegations are likely to exercise the procedural right to respond immediately today to each Western statement with standard counter-accusations. The Soviets and their allies probably are not prepared, however, to bear the responsibility for a collapse of the meeting and will work to demonstrate that they remain committed to "detente." [redacted]

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Current circumstances indicate that the East probably will not achieve its primary goal of obtaining agreement to convene a European disarmament conference. Eastern delegations nevertheless will continue to court West European opinion by maintaining that the neutral and nonaligned draft document is a useful basis for further negotiation. As a goodwill gesture, the Soviets may offer an initiative on security issues, probably a concession to the West's position regarding the zone of application for so-called military confidence- and security-building measures. [redacted]

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Human rights questions, however, will continue to be a stumblingblock. The Polish crisis and its ramifications will reinforce Soviet resistance to Western proposals, including those for meetings of human rights experts and for an end to jamming of radiobroadcasts into Eastern Europe. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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CHINA-USSR-US: Chinese Annoyance With Soviets

//Beijing accused Moscow on Saturday of trying to poison Sino-US relations. In private statements to foreign diplomats, Chinese officials have declared that relations with Moscow would have no prospect of improving even if Sino-US ties were to deteriorate.//

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Comment: //The Chinese are annoyed at recent Soviet and East European efforts to create the impression that Sino-Soviet relations are improving because of Chinese dissatisfaction with the US. Although the Chinese used the USSR's offer last fall to reopen border talks as a pretext for putting pressure on Washington, Beijing is now making clear that China is not willing to go along with the Soviet campaign.//

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CHINA-US: Criticism of Export Controls

//Beijing is criticizing US export control policy toward China in spite of the recent easing of restrictions on sales of technology and military equipment. Chinese trade officials are warning US businessmen that significant high-technology sales are being lost to foreign competitors because of licensing delays and other restrictions. These officials also are complaining to US Government representatives that export controls infringe on Chinese sovereignty and impede developing better relations between the two countries.//

Comment: //These actions reflect a Chinese desire to loosen US export controls further in order to provide freer access to US technology. At the same time, the Chinese are increasing their efforts to obtain US technology illegally.//

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR: Chernenko's Policy Views

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[REDACTED]

*The death of Mikhail Suslov and the quick assumption of his place in the leadership rankings by party Secretary Chernenko have altered the balance of opinion within the Politburo. Chernenko is generally identified with a less doctrinaire approach on foreign and domestic issues. Unlike Suslov, who deeply distrusted the West and favored tight control at home, Chernenko has been an outspoken proponent of President Brezhnev's foreign policy, of consumer interests, and of a more open leadership style.* [REDACTED]

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Brezhnev appears to have used Suslov's death to signal his support for Chernenko--his protege for the last 25 years--and his distrust of Andrey Kirilenko, a more senior party secretary who heretofore had been in the best position to succeed Brezhnev. Chernenko has assumed Suslov's place in the Politburo's protocol rankings, jumping over Kirilenko into the spot of unofficial second secretary. He also appears to be a strong candidate to take over some of Suslov's duties in the ideological and foreign policy areas. [REDACTED]

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The rise of Chernenko, which began in 1976, is totally attributable to Brezhnev's influence. He does not have an independent power base, having served for most of his career as a staff assistant with little managerial responsibility. [REDACTED]

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//Members of the US delegation at the summit in Vienna in 1979 noted that Politburo members in the Soviet entourage appeared to have little respect for him or his opinions, failing to include him in their conversations on many occasions.// [REDACTED]

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Brezhnev's support may do Chernenko little good after the President leaves the scene. Unless Brezhnev

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uses the time he has left to expand Chernenko's authority throughout the party bureaucracy, he may not be able to replace Brezhnev as party leader. Nevertheless, Chernenko's prospects have brightened considerably in the last two weeks, and his influence in policymaking circles probably will be greater.

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Brezhnev looks to Chernenko to continue his foreign policy. He has sought to enhance Chernenko's credentials in this field by taking him on various foreign visits and by sending him to Paris last week as the head of the delegation to the French Communist Party congress.

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Chernenko has emerged as a strong proponent of Brezhnev's approaches to the West, including his proposals on arms control. In a speech in 1979 marking his election to the Supreme Soviet, Chernenko went further than any leader other than Brezhnev in stressing the importance of strategic arms limitation talks and in calling attention to their potential economic benefits.

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Chernenko also appears to have been particularly concerned over the freeze in relations with the West following the invasion of Afghanistan. During an important round of leadership speeches in 1980, he did not publicly endorse the invasion and counseled against overreacting to the West's stand.

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Although Chernenko has taken the same tough line on Poland as other Politburo members, he seems to have a different assessment of its lessons. He places the blame for the Polish situation more on the Polish leadership's loss of contact with its people than, as Suslov thought, on the party's loss of its ideological bearings.

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In the domestic sphere, Chernenko has sought to cultivate the image of a leader attuned to popular feelings. He has led the fight against petty bureaucratic tendencies, promoted the creation of commissions to study public opinion, called for greater intraparty "democracy," pushed for improvements in consumer welfare, and urged that greater attention be paid to complaints from citizens.

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[redacted]

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Such proposals are often vague and may be largely cosmetic. They collectively suggest, however, that Chernenko favors a more open and responsive style of leadership and a less doctrinaire approach to dealing with the problems facing Soviet society than the approach favored by Kirilenko or Suslov. [redacted]

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New responsibilities and the pressures of political realities may cause Chernenko to alter his views in the months ahead. His current position on most important issues places him at the less conservative end of the Politburo's political spectrum. When Brezhnev goes, it will be difficult for him to enlist sufficient support to become General Secretary unless he modifies his stance. [redacted]

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Chernenko does not appear to have close allies other than Brezhnev among the full members of the Politburo. His policy views seem to conflict with those of Kirilenko and Premier Tikhonov, and his identification with Brezhnev's "opening to the West" and arms control proposals could become a liability if relations with the West continue to deteriorate. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, Chernenko has come a long way in the hierarchy, and he will continue his efforts to improve his position. Suslov's death has given him, with Brezhnev's help, increased opportunities to do so. Even if he succeeds Brezhnev, however, Chernenko's influence is likely to be circumscribed. [redacted]

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Chernenko would not initially inherit much of Brezhnev's authority, and, at 70, he might not have enough time to consolidate his position. Moreover, like Brezhnev, he would need to balance the conflicting demands of powerful bureaucratic interests, and growing economic constraints would further limit his choices. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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